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with this mosaic of safety nets is twofold. First, some
unilateral or combined moves by Member States are
not even necessary because they demand something
already recognized by EC Law. Second, some of these
instruments aim at safeguarding minor if not trivial
interests compared to the constitutional nature of the
Treaty. Declarations and Protocols not yet mentioned
earlier intend notably to protect or favour island
regions and overseas countries or territories, services
such as general economic services, public service
broadcasting, public credit institutions in Germany;
voluntary service activities; animal welfare; churches
and confessional organizations. Although it is
legitimate that Member States hold specific interests,
one may regret that the new Treaty has been chosen as
the battlefield for safeguarding interests perceived as
under threat. The Amsterdam phenomenon of
‘protocolarization’ certainly has disrupting and
polluting effects upon the Treaty.
Conclusion
More than previous Treaties in the process of European
integration, the First Pillar of the Amsterdam Treaty is
the result of a compromise. On one hand, the
compromise simultaneously stages positive upgradings
of the Maastricht Treaty including democratic
improvements, the extension of qualified majority
voting, a procedure for closer cooperation, a capacity
to act in favour of employment, and references to
fundamental rights, social rights and transparency. On
the other hand, one may regret not only that some of
these achievements are modest, simply cosmetic, offset
by protocolarization or wrapped up in legal uncertainty,
but also that the same compromise stages the nebulous
postponement of the institutional adaptation of the EU
to enlargement. The European Union was thus given
a bonus in Amsterdam but it is still sitting surrounded
by a mist preventing it from wisely considering
enlargement. As a compromise, the new Treaty on
European Union offers, after Maastricht, an improved
umbrella but a poor roof for an enlarged Union.
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As in 1991, the question of the further development of
Europe’s foreign policy capacities has once again
been high on the agenda of the 1996-1997 Inter-
governmental Conference. The high expectations of
1991 following the transformation in Maastricht of
European Political Cooperation (EPC) into CFSP had
not been fulfilled and following Europe’s poor
performance in the Yugoslavian crisis, European
citizens did not hide their disappointment. They have
increasingly seen the European Union as a paper tiger
incapable of acting and not able to take care of its own
security. Whether the amendments introduced in
Amsterdam will be able to change that image, remains
however very much the question.
During the fifteen months of negotiations, the IGC
in the area of foreign and security policy has primarily
focused on four questions: the issue of introducing
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV); the introduction of
the principle of flexibility; amendments with regard to
security and defence; and the question of institutional
changes.
The debate on the use of unanimity versus QMV is
as old as that on European foreign policy cooperation
itself. While for some countries like France and the
United Kingdom, the area of foreign policy is
considered too sensitive to transfer full sovereignty to
the European level, others like Germany, Italy and the
Benelux countries for example, judge that the
intergovernmental approach only constitutes an
intermediary phase, and estimate that the only way to
overcome the paralysis in CFSP is to move to decision-
making by QMV .
The Treaty of Amsterdam leaves no doubt as to
which school of thought has prevailed. Decision-
making by unanimity remains the general rule in the
field of CFSP (Art. J.13). A special or reinforced
Qualified Majority (at least 10 Member States in
favour) is possible but only for implementing common
strategies, joint actions or common positions which,
before, have already been adopted by unanimity.
There is an additional safeguard providing the
possibility for a Member State to oppose a decision by
QMV ‘for important and stated reasons of national
policy’. The Council can then bring the matter before
the European Council which has to decide by unanimity.
In practice this means that a Member State which
opposes a decision by QMV can always use its veto.
Member States also maintain their veto for decisions
having military or defence implications (Art. J.13.2).
The most important novelty for the decision-making
process in the Second Pillar is the possibility for
Member States to abstain, i.e. not to participate in
certain decisions under CFSP. In the event of such
positive or constructive abstention, the Member State(s)
in question are not bound by the EU decision, but the
Treaty asks them not undertake any action conflicting
with or impeding EU action. For flexibility to apply,
there has however to be a critical mass of countries
supporting the decision in question and the Treaty
stipulates that those abstaining should not represent7
more than one third of the votes weighted. Contrary to
the first and the Third Pillar where flexibility consists
of a majority of Member States moving ahead, in the
Second Pillar it is the result of one or more Member
States not participating in a decision. Whether this
new possibility will make it more easy to act in the area
of CFSP, will very much depend on the willingness of
the Member States to make use of constructive
abstention.
In the area of security and defence, the most
important achievement is undoubtedly the introduction
of the so-called Petersberg tasks into the Treaty
(Art.J.7.2). The European Union, in cooperation with
the Western European Union (WEU), can undertake
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks
and tasks involving combat forces in crisis management
including peacekeeping. This is undoubtedly a positive
development since these types of mission are most apt
to address the security challenges of the post-cold war
period and also the neutral countries can participate in
their implementation. It has however to be added that
the WEU still has a long way to go in further developing
its operational capacities before it has the potential to
fulfil the whole range of Petersberg tasks.
Further developments in the security area will, to
a large extent, also depend on the future relationship
between the EU and the WEU. The proposal by
France, Germany, the Benelux countries and Spain to
gradually integrate the WEU into the EU has not been
maintained. Due to the firm resistance of the United
Kingdom for whom NATO should remain the principal
forum for discussing European security and defence
questions, the text of the Treaty only refers to the
possibility of integrating the WEU into the Union,
making such a merger dependent on a unanimous
decision of the European Council. Such a decision
should be adopted in accordance with the Member
States’ respective constitutional requirements.
Another controversial issue was that of the
reformulation of the Treaty’s Article on defence (former
Art. J.4.1). The new Treaty speaks of a ‘progressive’
instead of a ‘gradual’ framing of a Common Defence
Policy, but there is still no firm commitment to a
common defence. Several Member States continue to
favour the Atlantic framework to discuss security and
defence issues and the presence of four neutral countries
in the negotiations presented a further stumbling block.
Lastly, the new article J.7 for the first time also
includes a reference to possible cooperation in the
armaments field. There is an increasing awareness that
European firms are losing their competitiveness vis-à-
vis the American giants and that unless there is increased
cooperation, they might not be able to survive. Whether
this vague clause will lead to any concrete results
remains to be seen and depends entirely on the Member
States who in the past have been extremely reticent to
combine forces.
Some of the most visible results in the Second
Pillar are a number of institutional novelties. The
widely discussed function of Mr or Mrs CFSP has been
created, but his/her tasks will not be performed by a
political personality as initially proposed by the French,
but by the Secretary General of the Council. The
primary tasks of this High Representative for CFSP
will consist in helping to formulate, prepare and
implement foreign policy decisions. Only if asked
specifically by the Presidency, the High Representative
can also perform representational tasks. This is probably
all the better since the addition of another player into
the existing ‘troupe’ might only increase the confusion,
rather than helping lead to the solution.
The Secretary General is helped in his tasks by a
newly established policy planning and early warning
unit, composed of experts from the General Secretariat,
the Member States, the Commission and the WEU.
The aim of this unit is to be a pool of information and
to help CFSP to become more pro-active, preventing
situations like Yugoslavia where the Member States
were totally taken by surprise.
Furthermore it is explicitly stated that the EU, in
the area of CFSP, can conclude international
agreements and there has also been concluded an
interinstitutional agreement between the European
Parliament, the Council and the European Commission
concerning the financing of CFSP, which should smooth
the implementation of CFSP decisions with financial
implications.
Whether the new Treaty of Amsterdam will succeed
in realizing the objectives defined by the Reflection
Group to make the external policies of the Union
‘more coherent, more effective and visible’ remains
very much the question.
Undoubtedly, the intergovernmental character of
CFSP has been maintained and even been reinforced.
Decisions will continue to be taken by unanimity and
the role of the European Council which defines the
general principles, the common strategies, and decides
whether to move towards a common defence has been
strengthened. Decisions by QMV are only possible
where there is basic unanimous agreement.
In the sensitive area of security and defence, no
major progress has been made. Member States continue
to have divergent views in this field, and the fact that
the EU has been enlarged with three neutral countries
has not made it easier to come to any consensus.
Contrary to the last IGC, where there was substantial
uncertainty with regard to the future of NATO and the
continuing commitment of the US to European security,
there was, this time, less pressure on the Member
States to make real progress. More and more countries
seem to have accepted the fact that in the years to come
NATO will continue to be the principal player on the
European security scene. With its recent rapprochement
with NATO’s military structures, even a staunch
Europeanist like France seems to be willing to admit
that the development of a fully independent European
security and defence identity outside the Atlantic
framework is not a realistic option. Germany, together
with France one of the most active supporters of a
fully-fledged CFSP, has been putting all its eggs in the8
EMU-basket and in Amsterdam the rescuing of the
Stability Pact became a more important priority than
further developing CFSP. The agreement on Combined
Joint Task Forces (CJTF) being reached last year at the
Atlantic Council in Berlin is undoubtedly much more
important for European security than the amendments
to Article J.7 of the Treaty on European Union.
The most interesting novelty in the Second Pillar is
probably the increased emphasis on flexibility, made
concrete through the possibility of constructive
abstention. Further enlargement will make it
increasingly difficult, if not impossible for the EU
Member States to speak with one voice. Through
constructive abstention, it should become easier to
take into account the different historical and geographic
interests of the Member States. It is however clear that
when Member States have a vital interest at stake, they
will not resort to abstention but will use their veto.
Constructive abstention can therefore not be expected
to provide a solution for situations of deadlock such as
the one surrounding the recognition of Croatia or
Macedonia. In many cases, it will therefore continue
to be extremely difficult for the Fifteen to agree to
action.
In conclusion, it can be said that despite a number
of institutional adjustments, the Treaty of Amsterdam
in the Second Pillar to a large extent maintains the
status-quo. Increased flexibility might constitute a
step forward but very much will depend on its
implementation. CFSP will continue to be an interesting
forum for cooperation and exchange of views in the
foreign policy area, but it is very doubtful whether
following Amsterdam it will be better prepared for the
type of crises like Yugoslavia or Albania.
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reenters the stage through the backdoor by means of
opt-in and opt-out protocols, temporal clauses, and
even flexible conditions for the ratification of Third
Pillar conventions. Most likely the results achieved by
the Dutch Presidency will give lawyers and
implementing officials in the Member States many
sleepless nights.
A New Title ‘Visas, asylum, immigration and other
policies related to the free movement of persons’
(IIIa)
In the ‘old’ Third Pillar construction, there are nine
matters of common interest. Some of these matters
have been found eligible for transfer to Community
law, namely immigration, asylum, external borders
(Visa Policy) and judicial cooperation in civil matters.
This Title – in which communautarian instruments,
methods of decision-making and legislation will apply
– should enter into force within five years after the
entry into force of the new Title (Article 73i). Taking
account of the eighteen months period required for
ratification, it may last six and a half years before the
provisions in this new Title enter into force. The free
movement of persons may thus only be realized in
2003 or 2004, which is more than a decade past the
previous 1992 deadline.
Even if the Member States succeed in the
progressive establishment of the Free Movement of
Persons Area, free movement will not apply integrally
to the whole EU. Exceptions to the abolition of internal
border controls are made for the United Kingdom and
Ireland (Article 73q). By means of a Protocol on the
The new Treaty of Amsterdam has been characterized
as extraordinarily difficult by dignitaries, journalists
and academics alike. The tremendous complexity of
the Amsterdam Treaty is largely due to the many
changes that were made in the area of Justice and
Home Affairs (JHA) Cooperation. Before Amsterdam,
cooperation in this field was already split between
communautarian and intergovernmental action. In
particular visa policy, fraud, money laundering,
customs cooperation and drugs were topics that were
scattered around in the Treaty. The fragmentation of
some justice and home affairs issues will continue
after Amsterdam. The three main ‘zones’ of cooperation
will be: 1) A New Title ‘Free Movement of Persons,
Asylum and Immigration’, which will eventually be
subject to full Community competence; 2) The
incorporation of the Schengen Acquis into the new
Treaty; and 3) A revamped Third Pillar with provisions
on Police and Judicial Cooperation.
What makes the new Treaty particularly difficult
to read are the many protocols and declarations that
clarify the positions (mostly reservations) of individual
Member States. With this ‘protocolarization’, the tack
has been firmly set on à la carte flexibility: even
though some of the protocols are not enabling clauses
but predetermined limits to integration, some Member
States have effectively been given a wide margin to
determine when they are ready for partial integration.
The incorporation of the Schengen Acquis means the
end of an awkward system of two parallel systems of
governance and hence of multi-speed integration. But
we should not overlook the fact that renewed flexibility